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monitoring on the l)ehaviour of individuals in dilfeient types of ownership 
patterns.
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1 In trod u ction
What structure of an organization is best in terms of the economic perfor­
mance of assets or services, that is productivity and profitability? The mar­
ket economy versus centraUy planned economy debate, and privatization, i.e. 
the transfer of assets or service functions from ]uiblic to private ownership or 
control, as an alternative to public ownershi]) are just some manifestations 
of the problem posed above.
Dealing with the issue of privatization. Adam Smith (1776, p.77) thought 
that piiblic administration was negligent ami wastt'lid because public em­
ployees do not have a direct interest in the commercial outcome of their 
actions and ]:)rivate owners have a greater incenti\'e to enhance the value of 
their lands through monitoring activities, eliminating waste and innovating.
The topic has many branches. We will mainly deal with the incentives 
created l>y diiferent types of ownership structiires: how can ])eo])le be mo­
tivated to act in consistence with economic efliciency? Should ownerhi]) be 
concentrated, or should it be diffused? The first gives rise to a hierarchi­
cal structure: the second, to a partnership. 0|)timal ownershi]) structure 
should also take into account potential inefficem’ies due to im])roper main­
tenance of assets. For example, giving the ownersliij) of a truck to its driver 
may increase efficiency since the driver will take lietter care of the truck. 
Whether the driver can afford to buy the truck is another issue, related to 
the functioning of capital markets.
2 L iteratu re Survey
Given that the topic of the thesis is "Efficient ownership patterns-Three 
examples”, it is convenient to begin by giving the definition of efficiency. 
Under no wealth effects, an arrangement is efficient for the parties involved 
if it maximizes their total equivalent wealth, regardless of how that total is 
distributed.
There are three main implications of ruling out the wealth effects: The 
individuals must be able to evaluate all of the Ijenefits and costs as being 
equivalent to some cash tiansfer, tliese evaluations must not depend on the 
wealth that the parties hold, the individuals must l>e able to make timely 
payments in whatever amounts may be required to divide up the l^enefits of 
the transaction without effecting the cost or Feasilulity of any other aspect 
of the transaction.
The definition of efficiency implies that the outcomes of economic activi­
ties tend to be efficient under costless bargaining and an environment where 
the agents can effectively implement and enforce their decisions.
Why do we put the emphasis on efiiciency as a criterion? How is efficiency 
related to the value creation in tlie economy? ( ’an |)ri va,te individuals achieve 
efficient outcomes on their own? The well-known tlieorem of Coase gives 
some insights al:)out the answers. C’oase showed that if the parties bargain to 
an efficient agreement and if their preferences dis|)lay no wealth effects, then 
the value-creating ax'tivities that they will agree u])on do not dej^end on the 
bargaining power of the parties or who owns what assets.
Therefore, in an economy where the ( ’oase theorem holds, efficiency alone 
determines the activity choice. The other factors can affect only the decision 
about how the costs and l:)enefits are to l)e shai-ed.
The necessary conditions of the Goase the'orem are quite restrictive. Be­
cause of the bargaining costs and transaction costs tliat arise from l:>ounded 
rationality, private information and unol)serval)ility of t he actions, value max­
imizing agreements may not be reachalde. Tlie l)est, we can ho])e for in such 
situations will l)e a ('onstraiiuxl efficiency. In the exam])le that is given at the 
end of the introduction, the driver may not have sufficient funds to buy the 
truck. Hence, the ownershi]) patterns may necessarily lead to an inefficient 
outcome.
At our second exam]>le we present a |)iol)lem wliere the existence of pri­
vate information will lead to a constrained-efficient outcome in some, but not 
in all cases. In the two other exam])les. we will focus on other impediments 
to reach an efficient outcome. Hence, our examples are concerned with situa-
tioiis where the (k)ase theorem fails; it is these rircumstances that ownership 
matters, in terms efficiency.
Even if none of the stated problems exist, efficiency may not be reachable 
if there are no clear, enforceable, easily transferal^le property rights. If the 
owner of an asset is not explicit and precise, then it will be overused (Hardin’s 
(1968) ’’tragedy of the commons” has made this point quite clear). On the 
other hand, if the property rights are not tradalde, there is little hope that 
the assets will be in the hands of the individuals who can use them most 
efficiently. Finally, if property rights are not luotected, individuals will have 
little incentive to invest in these assets not to lose their money (See Skaperdas 
(1993) for a model of conflict in tlie al^sence of property rights).
Therefore, ownership becomes a crucial issue when people fail to reach 
agreements that support efficient outcomes. What may be the main impedi­
ment for such ex-ante agreements? It is the incompleteness of contracts, i.e. 
the fact that ])arties are not be al:)le to s])ecifv every detail that may arise in 
the future. We dicuss the reasons of this incom|jletcMU'ss in detail in the next 
sertion.
2.1 Im pedim ents to Efficient O utcom es
2.1.1 Incompleteness of Contracts
Throughout this study, we make the fundamental liehavioral assumption 
that individuals act opportunistically whicli means tliat they do what they 
perceive to he in their own individual interest. Note that this is the plain 
old rationality assumption. Ojiiiortunistic individuals must lie motivated 
to fulfill their oliligations in tlieir relationslii|is witli others; for efficiency of 
the outcome, they must lie indiu ed to lie ‘dionest'’ and report information 
accurately.
Agreements must specify what action each agent should take, the rules 
and procedures that will used in settling jiotential conflicts, thereby regulat­
ing the behaviours that eaclj might expect from the others. We refer to such 
agreements as covtrncfs regardless of wliether they have the legal status of 
contracts. In fact, contracts may lie comjilelely im|ilicit with no ]iower of 
law behind them.
The motivation issue liecomes a iirolilem only when contacts can not 
be made comjilete and enforceable for some reason. In fact, a complete
3
contract will completely solve the motivation problem. A complete contract 
specifies what each party is expected to do in every possible circumstance, 
and arranges the distribution of realized costs and benefits in each contigency. 
If the original plan is an efficient one, then a com])lete contract can implement 
the plan leading to an efficient outcome.
In real life, it is nearly impossil:)le to think of an environment where a com­
plete contracts are be implemented. VVe can state three main requirements 
for contracts to be complete:
1- ) Each party must I'^ e al)le to foresee the potential and relevant con­
tingencies. The parties must also l)e al)le to descril)e these contingencies 
accurately and know which ])articular circumstances they considered before­
hand has actually occured.
2- ) The contract must clearly s])ecifv tlie a])])roi)riate actions to be taken 
at each state of nature.
3- The terms of the contract must 1)C \ erifial)l(' to a third party in order 
to he enforceable.
Because of bounded rationality, i.e. limited foresight, imprecise language 
(statements describing any resonably complex situation must be somewhat 
ambigious), the costs of calculating solutions and writing down a plan, not 
all of the contingiindes can be fully accounted for. E^ ven if all of the three 
requirements above were satisfied, the resulting complete document would 
be a very long one. Due to high costs (in terms of time and other resources) 
of writing almost complete contracts, real life contracts are necessarily in­
complete.
2.1.2 Information Problems
Even if every contingency could l)e foreseen and |)lanned for, and even 
if contractual commitments could be enforced, we still have the ])rol:)lem 
that one of the l^argainers may have relevant private information before the 
contract is signed. This may prevent to reach a value maximizing, efficient 
agreement. This source of ineffiency is ('ailed adverse selection'dnd it is pre­
con tractual o]:>portu nism.
We will investigate an adverse selection prol>lem in our second example 
which is a principal-agent framework wheie the agent who has different in­
terests than the ])rincipal is asked to act on l>elialf of the principal. In that
example, because of the agent’s quality is his jjrivate information, the prin­
cipal may not be sure whether the agent is acting in a way that is most 
profitable for the principal. Furthermore, there may he inadequate infor­
mation as to whether the terms of the agreement have been honored or 
acquiring information may be very costly. This brings in the possibility of 
self-interested behaviour, the celebrated proldem of moral hazard, a post- 
contractual op])ortunism. There are three ])reconditions for a moral hazard 
problem: first; there must be some potential divergence of interest between 
the parties, second; there must be a basis for gainful exchange or another type 
of coordination between the individual that activates the divergent interests, 
and finally there must l.^ e difficulties in determining whether the terms of the 
contract have heeu followed.
In our first examj^le, we will deal witli a way of reducing the moral hazard 
prol:)lem, monitoring. Monitoring will reduce tlie information problem at a 
cost. If the cost exceeds it benefit, obviously monitoring can not l.^ e a solution 
to the moral hazard j^roblem.
To summarize the discussion alcove, the self interested behaviour of the 
agents may prevent the realization of an efficient |)lan. This is so because 
individual interests under actual contracts will not necessarily be properly 
aligned.
2.1.3 Relation-sp ecific Investments
An invesf nictit is an expenditure of money or otlier resources that creates 
a potential continuing flow of future l)enelits and scu x ices. When significant 
investments are required, even relatively simide contracts can be subject to 
various problems. The most problematic investments are the investments in 
specific assets- that is, assets that are most valualde in one specific setting 
or relationship.
An important special case of specific assets are cospecialized assets. Two 
assets are cospecialized if they are most produc tive when used together and 
lose much of their value if used seperately to ])roduce independent products 
or services. Our second exam])le is a case wlieie a machine and another asset, 
information, are cospecialized and efficienc-y will l>e rc^ached only when they 
are used together.
The specificity of assets together with ini])erfe( t contracting causes the 
hold-up problem. The hold-up problem imi>edes investment ex ante: worries
about being forced to accept some disadvantagenous terms later, once a sunk 
investment is made, or about that the investment may be damaged by the 
actions of the others, reduces the incentives to invest in a specific asset.
In the next section, we will try to find a way to solve the prol:)lems de­
scribed in this section. We will mainly focus on assigning ownership in the 
most efficient way and see how useful it is in eliminating the obstacles pre­
venting efficiency.
2.2 Ownership as a D eterm inant of Efficiency
2.2.1 W hat is Ownership ?
Ownership is the residual rights of control ov(‘r an asset, that is, the rights 
to make any decisions about the usage of tlie asset that are not explicitly 
given away l)y a contract or restricted 1)V law.
If contracts were com])lete, residual returns would have no meaning for 
the simple reason that there would l)e no unspecified rights, hence nothing 
would be residual. Fiut since most contracts are incomplete, residual rights 
of control are important. How they should l)e assigned is the main subject 
of the thesis.
Residual returns of an asset is defined to l)e tfje returns accrued after the 
eventualities. Like residual control, this concept is relevant onl}^  in a world 
of incomplete contracts. If contracts were comi)K‘te. the distribution of the 
returns could be specified in detail, hence no relurii would l)e left residual.
There is certainly a close link between residual rights of control and resid­
ual returns of an asset. If the person who has the residual control rights also 
has the rights over residual returns, an efficient solution can be reached by 
maximizing his own return. We will show tliis in our second example. In 
that example, the residual control will automati(\illy be in the hands of the 
party who has a private information and making tliis same person also the 
residual claimant will lead to an efficient outi'ome. But making the person 
who has no j^rivate information (so no residual control rights), the residual 
claimant, will have some |)rol)al)ility of leading to an inefficient outcome.
Our conclusions will enforce tlie common belief tliat an efficient way to 
motivate people to create, maintain and ini])rov'e assets is the assignment of 
residual control rights, i.e. ownership.
fi
2,2.2 Unified Ownership; A Solution for Reaching Efficiency?
The solution to the stated problems of not reaching an efficient outcome 
in economic activities may be a unified structure, where one party to the 
transaction takes command of the assets of the second, internalizing the 
transaction. It will reduce the need to have contracts which is the origin 
of most of the problems. From now onwards, a ’’firm” refers to a unified 
structure commanding an array of assets.
According to an argument, when the market transactions work well, the 
firm may replicate the same style and when there are efficiency gains from 
deviating from the market ty])e transactions, the central management may 
selectively intervene to the operations of llie relevant unit. But then there 
will be no limit on the efficient size of an organization. This argument is not 
acceptable for the following reasons:
1- ) As the size of a firm increases, the uncertainty in that organization 
increases. This increase in uncertainty will make tlie problems of the orga­
nization more complex, leading to decreasing returns to scale. An increase 
in uncertainty is clearly not favoral‘)le to the finns that rely on long term 
contracts.
2- ) In a hierarchical organization, there will l)e what Williamson (1985) 
calls a control loss problem. As the firm gets larger, more levels of organi­
zation will be added implying that the contiol loss ])rol:>lem becomes more 
severe. Hence, a point may come where the costs of control loss exceed the 
gains from scale. Thus, selective intervention is not ])ossible because it relies 
on control.
3- ) High powered market incentives generally fail to exist in firms because 
of the moral hazard issue; the firm is organized as a nexus of vague contracts. 
Therefore, incentives in firms do not match tliose in the market.
In general, many individuals can work on tlie same set of assets. If the 
actions of each individual includes an im^estment s])ecific to those assets, the 
way ownership is vested matter as far as it determines the returns of these 
investments. If the investment of the owner of I lie unified structure is more 
”im])ortant” than the others’, the unifitxi structure will be an efficient way 
of organization since it will provide higher iiK'entives to the owner. If the 
investments of the others are more important, which is generally the case \
Ht is so because the owner is just one person and tlie others, e.g. the workers form 
the majority. This argument has most of its power wlien most of the investments are on
the unified structure will give less incentives to them and so it is not efficient.
4- ) Since incentives in a unified structure are weak, the owner may pre­
fer to monitor, and monitoring is costly. VVe study this case in one of our 
examples.
5- ) When a decision affects the distribution of the benefits among mem­
bers, the individuals may attempt to influence the decisions to their own 
benefit. Thus, efficiency might suffer from these self interested activities. 
The costs of such activities are called as influence costs. The magnitude 
of influence costs increases when two sej^erate organizations are brought to­
gether under a central management with the power to intervene selectively. 
For example, the units may try to transfer more resources to their unit even 
if it is not value maximizing, l)ut just a transfer increasing the benefits of the 
receiving unit.
Hence, besides their achievement of activities wliicdi the seperate units can 
not do, the unified structure itself generattMl j^roldems that were not present 
in the market, before the transaction is l)roiiglit in a. unified structure. The 
comparison of a market and a unified striK'ture de])ends on the nature of the 
transaction. This issue is discussed in the next section.
2.3 T he O ptim al G overnance Structures for Various
T ypes o f Ti'ansactions
What is the most efficient ownershi]) pattern or tlie governance structure 
for different types of transactions? The principal dimensions for describing 
a contract are asset s])ecificity, uncertainty and fri^quency. By holding un­
certainty constant, we can investigate the efficient type of organization in 
terms of asset specificity and frequency. We will have three Inroad levels of 
asset specificity -nonspecific, mixed and highly s])ecific -and two levels of 
frequency- occasional and recurrent (See Williamson (1985)). Table 1 sum­
marizes the most efficient organization ty]>e for each of these cases.
luinian capital. But if the model is extended through time, tins kind of an argument may 














We have two main deductions from Talde 1: first, special governance 
structures are not needed for highly standardized transactions, second, only 
recurrent transactions may require a highly sj^ecualized gov^ernance structure.
Market transactions are especially efficient when there are recurrent non- 
specific transactions. Hence, standard transactions must be performed under 
a market structure. The market j^rovides efficient j^rotection from oppor­
tunism.
Trilateral governance includes the assistance of a third party in resolving 
disputes and evaluating performance. The tliird ]>arty takes the adjudicary 
role. It is an ideal Wciy of governance for oc(^asional transactions of both 
mixed and highly specific kinds. In such 1 ransactions, the continuation of 
the relation is important since specialized investments are taken. Relying on 
a market transaction is not sensible because these specialized investments 
need better ])rotection. But it is also not wise to use a transaction specific 
governance structure since set up costs can not Ije recovered for occasional 
transactions. Trilateral governace is somewhat l)etween these two ways.
Transaction-specific governance is good for mixed and highly specific 
transactions of a recurrent type since the continuation of the relationship 
is very important due to the nonstandardized nature of the transaction. Un­
der recurrent transactions, costs of spe('ialized gox eniance can be recovered. 
There are two t\q)es of transaction-specific governaiK'e: l:)ilateral structures 
and unified structures. The autonomy of the ])a.rties is maintained under a 
[bilateral structure whereas the transaction is removed from the market and 
organized within the firm under unified governaiK'e. If one of the parties 
engages in transactions frequently and the othei* less frequently, a hierarchi­
cal form may lie a.]q)ropriate where the first i^arty is the owner. In fact, in
9
our first example, we will investigate a bilateral stucture (the partnership) 
and a unified structure (the hierarchy). We will derive conditions about the 
relative efficiency of organizing the transaction under a unified structure; or 
a bilateral structure. Our conclusions will have potential implications about 
the limit for the size of a firm.
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3 F irst E xam ple: A  M on itor in g  G am e
3.1 T he M odel
Consider an economy consisting of two assets and two individuals, A and B, 
with the following set of opportunities. Each can choose to work individually 
on a project or they can decide to undertake the project together either in 
a form of partnership or in a form of hierarchy where one individual is the 
principal, the other the agent. Individual production requires at least one 
of the assets. In accordance with the inconijilete contracts apiiroach, we 
assume that contracts are incomplete as to the exjiost division of the output; 
the share one gets from joint juoduction deiiends ratlier on one’s bargaining 
power, which in turn depends on how ownershi]) is vested. In the partnership 
structure, one of the assets is owned hy A and the other hy B, so that the 
surplus is equally distributed. In the hierarchy, l>oth assets will be owned by 
one party, whom we will call, the princiiial. The other ]iarty is the worker. 
We therefore have a standard iirincipal-agent setting where the principal 
takes all of the surplus and gives a reservation wage to the worker. Now, we 
will investigate the two structures one l)y one and then compare the results 
in terms of efficiency.
In both partnership and hierarchy, eacli individual faces a decision to 
supply working effort. This is a l)inary clioi('e, ./* = 1 for working, and x = 0 
otherwise. The cost of working is c. The ])roject carried hy two individuals 
yields S(2) if both work, whereas the yield to a one-person enterprise is 8(1).
A ssum ption 1: If no individual works, there is no yield, i.e. S{0) = 0. 
The yield from a two-person enterprise is more tlian the sum of the yields 
from two seperate one-person enterprises, i.e. >'(2) > 28'(1).
Though the outjuit is observable, an individiiaTs working decision is not 
ol^servable to the other. This may lead to o|)]>ortunistic behaviour in the or­
ganizational form, be it the ])artnershi]) or hierarcliy: in the partnership each 
individual has an incentive to free ride, and in the hierarchy the agent has an 
incentive to shirk. In order to prevent free riding, each ])artner disposes of an 
identical monitoring technology which identifies the tree rider in a way that 
can be proved to a third party with prol^alulity p{m) if rn is the monitoring 
effort. Similary, in the hierarchy the principal exerting a monitoring effort rn 
can prove that the agent shirks with ])rol)alulity p{rn) if the agent actually 
shirks. We will denote the disutility of monitoring effort by (l{rn). Both p{rn)
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and d(7n) are ('omnion information, i.e. tliey are functions that are known 
by both A and B.
Assumption 2: [0,1] has the following properties: p(0) = 0,
p {rn) > 0, p (m) < 0 for all m G 7?.·*· and lim,n^ocP{iii) = 1·
Assumption 3: d:1Z'^  —> has the following properties: d(0) = 0,
(i(m) > 0, and d"{77i) > 0 for all 771 G
Let Xi denote the probability that individual i works where i G {A,B}.  
So, Xi G [0,1].
We start with the analysis of the i)artnership in the first section and then 
we will look at the hierarchy in the second section. Finally, we will compare 
the two structures in terms of efficiency in tlie third section.
3.2 T he Partnership
As mentioned, the partners share the total suri)lus ef|ually. We can write the 
objective function of i, where i . j  G {/!,/?}, as:
Vj = + (1 -  ■«·.,·)( 1 -  p { i n i ) ) ' ^  + (1 -  X j ) p { 7 7 i i ) S { \ )  -  d(?/?.,·) -  c]
+(1 -;i-i):r,(l -p{m j))·^
= + (1 -  ;Pj)(l + P{m¡)) '^  -  d{7ni) -  c]
+(1 -  xi)xj{l - p i m j ) ) ' - ^ (1)
The best re])ly of individual i, denoted l)y r,, <’an l>e defined in the obvious 
way: it is a pair of (possibly mixed) working strategy and a monitoring effort 
{xi,77ij} maximizing (1) given {.»■,·,/??.,}. More precisely, r, : [0,1] x 71'  ^ —+ 
[0,1] X 7?.·*· where the first component re]>resents the probability of working 
Xi and the second represents the monitoring effort ?»,. We shall consider 
the Nash equilibrium of this partnership game. The components of the best 
reply mapping can be determined from (1) as follows: ;r* = 1 if
>'(2) >'(1) .‘>'(1)
·'■,/—7-  + (1 -  ·'■./)(^  ------  ( > :<·.,( 1 -  /> ( i» ,) ) -^ (2)
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= 0 if
+  (1 -  ^ i)(l -  d(mi) - c <  Xj{l -  p (m j))^^^(3)
and Xi G [0,1] if
+  (1 -  ^i)(l + p (” '< ) - ^  -  -  P (» « i))-^ (4 )
On the other hand, assuming an interior solution, the optimal monitoring 
eifort of agent i is implicitly defined by ,r,(l — ,r,)(,S'(l )/2)(f);)(7n,)/(9mj) = 
Xi(dd{mi)ldmi). If r, ^  0, it reduces to:
( l - ' O )
.S'(l) (:>p(m,·) dd(iUi)
dm; dm; i )^
If Xi = 0, agent i will not monitor because he has no output to lose to 
a possibly free riding agent j .  Agent / will obtain 5(1 )/2 if agent j  works 
and zero,otherwise. Thus, when .r, = 0, there is no monitoring by agent i, 
i.e. mi = 0. We also see from ecpi. (5) that the monitoring eifort is positive 
only when the partner puts positive proliability on shirking. Therefore, when 
X j = 1, 7Hi is again zero.
The only reason why equation (5) may not admit a solution is that the 
left hand side may be smaller than the right hand side for all m € from 
assumptions (2) and (3). The interpretation is straightforward: the cost of 
monitoring, d{m), is always relatively higher than the benefit of monitoring, 
p(m), and so it is optimal to choose (/?, = 0 in such a situation.
P roposition  1 : There are four possible .Nash Eciuilibrium outcomes 
among which the first two are in pure strategies, the last two are in completely 
mixed strategies at least for one of the jiartners. The outcomes presented 
below are exhaustive.
1- ) If<-<
= (1,0) and {xg,m'fj) = (1,0)} is a Nash equilibrium.
2- ) I f .■> .S-(l)/-2.
{(a:^,m^) = (0,0) and {xp,m'‘ff) = (0,0)} is a Nash equilibrium.
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3- ) If .‘>’(l)/2  < c <  5(1),
there may exist Nash equilibria in which one agent free rides while the 
other is ’’mixed” : both
{(хд =  0,Шд =  0) and {xg G [0,1], nig > 0)} or alternatively, { {x*^  E 
[0, l],ni^ > 0) and (;rg =  0,Шд =  0)} may be Nash equlibria.
4- ) If c < 5(2)/2,
{(;c*4 e [0, l],m *4 > 0) and (.Гд G [0, 1], /Ug > 0) }
may be a Nash equilibrium.
Proof :
The ]uoof follows from inspection of the best-reply mappings.
1- ) Given that B works (and does not monitor). A will optimally choose 
1ПА = 0. Moreover, A will decide to work if c < (.^ '’(2) ~ 5(1 ))/*“? by substi­
tuting = іПд — 0 to (2). .So, if the additional surplus, (5(2) — 5'(l))/2 
is greater than the cost of working, c, A will ]>refer to work. The arguments 
are the same from B’s point of view.
2- ) Given that B does not work and hence does not monitor A, A prefers 
not to work if, from (3), (>S'(1)/2)(1 -|- р{іпа)) — (і(іпа) — с < 0. But since 
niA when Xa = 0, using Ша = 0 in this condition reduces it to o S W / 2 ·  
The arguments are again the same from B’s ])oiiit of view.
3- ) We consider the case in which B is iiidiffereiit l^etween working and 
free riding and A does not work and = 0. (liven these strategies, A 
prefers not to work if
. •‘’'C·^ ) , ,, .,5 '(1 )  ^ . ,,5(1)
+ (1 -  -----'■ < ·'·«(! -  p(^»b ))—J -
and B will be indifferent between working and free riding if 
^^^(1  + РІ7Уі*в)) -  e = (1[т%)
where lUg is found from (·')) l)y substituting .r 4 = 0 and m*^  is zero since 
A prefers not to work.
Notice that there may be no combination of /»g and xb which satisfy the 
three conditions mentioned above. Then, the specified Nash equilibrium will
14
not exist. Therefore, we can not give a sufficient condition in terms of the 
parameters of the model, c, .9(1) and .9(2) for the existence of the specified 
Nash equilibrium.
However, we can determine necessary conditions. If we solve for p(/u^) 
from the second condition above;
d{m)f) + c -  ^
2
Since p{7n*ß) < 1, c < 5’(1) — (¡(niß) and —d{m“ß) < 0, we can find that 
c < 5 ’(l).
If we solve the first condition for x*ß, we get
5 (1) — c
Xß <
.“.'(I) -  i f +  ^ -</(>««)-
Using Assumption 1, i.e. .S'(l) — S'(2)/2 < 0 and the deduction that 
S{\)/2 — d{mß) — c < 0, yields the condition ,S’(1) —5'(2)/2 + 5’(l)/2  — — 
c < 0. From the fact that X2 > 0, we can find ,S'(l)/2 — c < 0.Therefore 
c> ,S '(l)/2 .
Hence, a necessary condition for the specified outcomes to be Nash equi­
libria is .9(1)/2 < c < .9(1).
4-) B’s monitoring effort and that his is indifference between working and 
free riding implies that, A will be indifferent between working and free riding 
as well if the corresponding two first order conditions for and rriß are 
satisfied. From these conditions, and Xß are ol)tained as follows:
S(\)
X a =
d{m%) + c -  (1 4- p{m%))
_  ^ ( 2  +  p(m*ß) -  p(m*j^ ))
X r> --
d(m^) + c -  (1
ilM _  ¿m(2 + p(m*J -  p{Wß))
It is quite possil)le that these conditions can not lie all satisfied by xa ·, xbi 
As in case (3), we are not able to give a sufficient condition in terms of the
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parameters of the model, .9(1), .9(2) and c. We can, however, give a necessary 
condition. From the equality for x \  above,
d(nifl) +  c -  (1 + p ( u i s ) ) ^ ^ ^  <  -  .9(1)
since < 1. But then c < *S'(2)/2 — .^ ’(l)/2  — p{rn*^)S{\)/2.
Using Assumptions 2 and 3, i.e. p{m*p^ ) < 1 and —d{m'^) < 0, we obtain 
c<S{2)/2.
The four types of equilbria above are exhaustive, i.e. no other Nash 
equilibrium exists. The proof of this statement is given in the Appendix.
Q.E.D.
3.3 The Hierarchy
Here, ownership is confined to, say. A, who Ijecomes the principal while B 
is the agent. Hierarchy has two distinctive features that contrast with the 
partnership. First, ownership of the assets is concentrated in the hands of A. 
Ownership entitles him how to use these assets. Second, monitoring follows 
the pattern of the hierarchy: A disposes of a technology to monitor B but B 
does not. In fact, as can be easily shown, tlie assumj^tion of incomplete con­
tracts as to the ex-post division of the sui ])lus and tlie definition of ownership 
rights imply that B would never monitor A.
The sequence of events is as follows: first, A offers a. wage contract to 
B who may either accept oi· reject. If B rejects the contract, B ol:)tains his 
reservation wage (which is normalized to zero) and A is left with just two 
alternatives: to work or not to work. If c <  ,S’( 1 ), he will work and produce 
a positive surplus of S{\) — r and if c > ,S'( 1), he will not work. If B accepts 
the contract, the outcome is described by the Nash eciuilibrium.
A will foresee the post-contract Nash eciuililu iiim of the inspection game, 
(depending on the parameters of the model) and offer lo = 0 if B will not 
work and w = c if B works in the equilil)rium. Howev'er, we will show later 
that lu > c may l)e offered if in the i)Ost-contract Nash equilil)rium, B’s 
strategy is completely mixed (indifferent l)etween working and shirking).
The returns of A and B de])end on their decision of working or not work­
ing. If hath works, A’s net returns is ,S’(2) — c and B's is w — c. If A works,
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but not B, A will obtain .S'(l) — c and B nothing. If B works, But not A, A 
gets 5'(1) and B lo — c. Given a specified wage contract {tw}, the objective 
function of A is:
Va = ;c,4(a;B(.?(2)-Uj) + (l-;rB )(l-p(i» .4)(.S '(l)-iy)-(l-;C B )p(m ^)5(l) 
-d(77iA) -  c) + (1 -  auj-TBiAXl) -  «.')
= ;iu(j;j(5'(2) -  tw) +  (1 -  ;i:B)(.S'(l) -  w + p(m^)u;) -  d(nM) -  c)
+(1 -  -  w). (6)
The ol>jective function of B is:
Vb = xsitv -  c) + (1 -  u-b U-aII -  p(">A))tv (7)
On the other hand, assuming an interior solution, t he optimal monitoring 
effort of agent i is implicitly defined by .r,4(l — .cb)«’P (” m ) = ->'Ad (771a)· If 
xa 7^  0, it reduces to;
(1 -  x b )wp {771a ) = d {771a )· (8)
As in the case of partnershi]), A will not monitor B if he himself does not 
work. The deduction that 771a = 0 if the first order condition has no solution 
remains.
A ])ost-contract .Nash equilibrium is defined as follows: Xa i I^ a^ m^xiniizes 
(6) given ;Cb and x^  maximizes (7) given and n?^. The Nash equilibrium 
of the whole game includes, in addition to the strategies described above, the 
optimum wage contract {tv*} which maximizes (6) given ;r^, Xg and
As in the partnership case, there are also four possilde Nash Equilibrium 
outcomes here, characterized by Proposition 2 I>elow. Among these, the first 
two are in pure strategies, the last two are in completely mixed strategies, 
at least for one of the partners.
P roposition  2 : Depending on the parameters of our model, there are 
four possible Nash equilibria wliich can lie specified as follows:
l - ) I f o .S '( l ) ,
{(u>* = 0,;«·^  = = 0) and = 0} is a Na.sh equilibrium.
17
2- ) I f r< .9 ( l ) ,
{(u;* = 0,;r^ = l,m ^ = 0) and Xß = 0} is a Nash equilibrium.
3- ) If.S'(l) = c,
{(u;* = 0, 6 [0, = 0) and Xß = 0} is a Nash equilibrium.
4- ) I f c < .9 ( 2 ) - 5 ’(1),
{(re* = cfp{i7i*^),x’^  = l,m ^ > 0) and x*ß € [0, 1]) may be Nash equilib­
rium.
The four cases presented above are exhaustive, i.e. no other Nash equi­
librium exists.
Proof :
1- ) Given that B shirks, A will not monitor B and will offer w = 0. If 
c > 5(1), he will also prefer not to work.
Given that A does not monitor B, the latter will not work. Hence, the 
specified strategies form a Nash equilibrium.
2- ) The only difference from the proof of part (1) is that now c < 5 ’(l). 
But then A will prefer to work; so that x^ = 1· CJiven A does not monitor 
B, B does not work.
3- ) Given that B does not work and if ,S'(1) = (\ then the principal will be 
indifferent l)etween working and not working. We have rn*^  = 0 and Xß = 0 
and IV = 0 1)V the same arguments as in ]>art (1) and (2).
4“) From (7), given A’s decision to work and his positive monitoring effort, 
B will be indifferent between working and shirking if
w — c = (1 — implying that w* > c since p{rn*^ ) > 0.
From (6), given G [0,1], the following inequality must be satisfied for 
A to decide to work:
X2(.9(2) -  u;) + (1 -  x-2 ) { S { l ) -  w + p{riiA)n') -  d(m.4) - c >  as2(5’(l) -  w) 
where satisfies (8). If such an m,\ does not exist, the specified strategy
can not be a Nash equilibrium strategy.
By simplifying and solving for xy  yields.
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X r >
— 5(1) + + (¡[yjl'g)
S{2)-2S{1)
Because 5(2) > 25'(1) from Assumption 1 and < 1, we have —5(1) + 
w + d{7ii*ff) < S{2) — 25(1). Also since w > c and d{mg) > 0, it must be 
that c < 5(2) — 5(1). Therefore, c < 5(2) — 5(1) is a necessary condition ( 
not a sufficient condition since m*^  niay be found to l)e zero from (8)).
That other strategies can not be realized as Nash outcomes proved in the 
Appendix.
Q.E.D.
3.4 T he Two Structures Compared
We will now compare the two structures, the ])artnership and the hierarchy, 
in terms of efficiency, i.e. the total sur]>lus generated. Note that we are not 
concerned with the distriliution of the total sur])lus. The structure which 
generates a higher surplus will lie said to dominate tlie other.
Proposition 3 : If c < (5(2) — 5(l))/2 , the partnership dominates the 
hierarchy. If 5(2)/2 < c < 5(2) — 5(1) the hierarchy may dominate the 
partnershi]i. If c > S{2) — 5(1), both structures are equivalently efficient. If 
(5(2) — 5( 1 ))/2 < c < 5(2)/2, the domination dejiends on the two functions, 
p and d.
Remark : We saw in Fhoposition 1 and Fbo|iosition 2 that there may 
be more than one Nash equilibria for some values of 5(1), 5(2) and c. In 
such cases, we will assume that the parties will choose the structure whose 
outcome corresponds to the highest total surjilus.
Proof : If c < (5(2) — 5(l))/2 , the maximum total surplus is 5(2) — 2c. 
This is obtained in a partnership structure (see F’ru]iosition 1) w'hereas it is 
never olitained in a hierarchy (see F*ro]iositiun 2). Therefore the partnership 
structure definitely dominates the liierarchy for this range of jiarameters 
values.
If c > (5(2) — 5(l))/2 , the results depend on whether 5(1) is greater or 
smaller than (5(2) — 5(l))/2 . We first will consider the case where 5(1) < 
(5(2) — 5 (l))/2  and later the case wdiere ,8'(1) > (.S(2) — 5(l))/2 .
H)
Now, assume that c > (.S'(2) — .S'(l))/2 and .S'(l) < (.9(2) — .S'(l))/2. If 
we further assume that c < ,9(2) — .9(1), the liierarrhy may dominate the 
partnership if the Ncish equilibrium in the hierarchy structure is described by 
case 4 of Proposition 2. This is so because l)oth individuals don’t work in the 
partnership from Proposition 1. But if c > ,9(2) — .9(1), the two structures 
are equivalently efficient since both A and B will not work.
Now, assume that c > (.9(2) — ,9(l))/2 and ,9(1) > (.9(2) — ,9(l))/2. 
Moreover, if .S'(l) < c < ,9(2)/2, the Nash equilibrium outcome in both the 
partnership and the hierarchy be given liy the case of Proposition 1 and 
2. Respectively, the comparison dej^ends on tlie values of xa and x b - If 
,9(2)/2 < c < ,9(2) — .9(1), the hierarchy may dominate the partnership 
provided that we aie in case 4 of Proi)osition 2 since l>oth A and B will not 
work in the partnership. If c > .9(2) — .9(1), the structures are equivalently 
efficient since both A and B will not work. If c < .9(1), the partnership has 
its outcome described by case 2,3 or 4 of F’ro])osition 1 whereas the outcome 
of the hierarchy may l>e described by cases 2 or 4 of Proposition 2. Therefore, 
the com])arison dejjends on the functions />(/») and d{m).
Q.E.D.
In this example, we give a model which ])uts a limit on the efficient size 
of an organization. We observed that the |)arnersliip, where the ownership 
of assets are not concentrated, may 1)C lietter than the hierarchy in terms 
of efficiency. Therefore, the claim that efiiciency increases as the firms get 
larger and larger is not correct.
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4 Second  E xam ple: In form ation  and Effi­
c ien cy  o f  O w nerhip
We cojisider two individuals, A and B. A is a potential buyer of a product 
manufactured by B. The value of the jiroduct to A is u. The cost of produc­
tion to B is fK'(Q). where Q G 'R·'^  is the total quantity produced and /i is 
an efficiency parameter that can take only two values: /5 and fi. We identify 
these values with the types of individual B: high quality workers (^), and 
low quality workers (/i) where € 'R'^, /9 < li)· The jirobability that B is 
of high quality and low quality is tt and tt, resjjectively. A makes a transfer 
T  to high quality types and T_ to low ciuality ty])es.
In this example, information al)out tlie ty|)e of B <'an lie interpreted as a 
relation-specific asset because it has no value outside the relationship. Two 
cases will lie investigated: the case where there is symmetric information and 
the case where there is asymmetric information. The former case will refer 
to integration since both A and B will lie informed and the second case will 
refer to nonintegration since only B will have the information.
The crucial assumption is the com|ileteness of contracts, i.e. every pos­
sible outcome and the corresponding |iayoffs can lie specified in unlimited 
detail if necessary. We will try to find whether the «‘fficiency is affected or 
not if the party who offers the contract changes.
A ssum ption 1: The cost function ( '{Q.d) is defined as C : Q x  B ^  Q 
where Q = ((), oo) and B = {i[, /5} and ( ’((),.) = 0, C'iQ , .) > 0, C "(Q ,.) > 0 
for all Q.
According to Assumption 1, both types of B dispose of a strictly convex 
cost-of-effort function (recall that effort is identically to output).
4.1 Case 1 : Sym m etric Inform ation
4.1.1 C on trac t is Offered by A
If the A knows B’s t}qie (/i), he offers: (T. Q) to type where




(T, Q) to type where
Q = or(/max(v(5 -  0C{Q)) 
and f  = fiCiQ)
Solving by differentiating witli resjx-'ct to Q and equating to zero yields 
the following values for Q,T.,Q. T:
Q =  C '- ^{vK l)
T = ij_C{Q) = (i_C{C'-\vl(i))
Q = C '- \vH i)
f  = BC{Q) = BC{C'-HvlB))
Note that A captures the whole surplus generated by the relation no 
matter B’s type. Assuming that the reserv'ation utility of the agent is zero, A 
gives B just his cost since he knows the type of B. Therefore, maximizing the 
surplus of A is equivalent to maximizing the total sui])lus. Hence, maximum 
possible total sur])lus is obtained in this case and the resulting outcome is 
efficient.
4.1.2 Contract is offered by B
If B is a type, he will offer (T, Q) where 
Q_ — av(jm^x{vQ — lK'{Q))
and T_ = vQ
If B is a 0 tyj)e, he will offer (T,Q) where 
Q -  ar(inmx{vQ -  0C{Q))
It is easy to verify that the solution of Q and Q are exactly the same 
as the case where the contract is offered by A. The difference lies in that B 
is getting all of the surplus since he demands a transfer equal to the value 
of the product to A. Therefore, as far as efficiency is concerned, it does not 
matter who offers the contract in the case of symmetric information. In each 
case, maximum total surplus is ol)tained and lioth outcomes are efficient. We 
proceed below with the case of asymmetric information.
and T = vQ
4.2 Case 2 : A sym m etric Inform ation
4.2.1 Contract is Offered by A
Now, let us assume that A does not know the type of B; but instead the 
probability of being of each ty]>e. The luoliabilities that B is a high quality 
or a low quality one, are f  and tt, respectively. Now, A must consider the 
possibility that B can choose a contract which is designed for another type. 
In fact, we can show that B who will want to deviate is the /i type. If the 
same contract is offered as in the symmetric information case, /5 will prefer to 
produce Q and take T since T_—BC{Q) > 0 while T_ —,SC{Q) = 0 and S < S· 
Therefore, A must give S sufficient incentives to enft)rce him to choose the 
contract designed foi· him, a course of action which requires A to sacrifice 
some of the total surplus. The problem of P\. is as follows:
Q.T,Q.T
subject to
Pfl : I - SC{Q) > 0
Pfi ■ f  - SC{Q) > 0
ICfi : T - SC{(J) > T - S C ( Q )
•2;i
IC^ : T - i K : { Q ) > T - ( ) C { Q ) ,
where P and IC refer to the participation and incentive compatibility con­
straints, respectively.
A would obviously prefer all of the four constraints to be satisfied with 
equality. But, as argued above, /5 type will prefer to shift to the contract 
offered to a type. Hence, IC^ will not hold if other three hold with equality. 
Therefore, A has to sacrifice something. We’ll assume that IC^ and Pf) are 
satisfied with an equality. We can establish the following well-known result.
Lem m a 1: If IC^ and P^ are satisfied with an equality, then ICf) and P^ 
are satisfied.
If ICfj holds with equality,
f - l i C { Q )  = T - lK J{Q )
which can be arranged to yield
{ f - T ) - H C { Q ) - C { Q ) )  = 0 {*)
Since ft > ft, we have
{ f - T ) - f t { C { Q ) - C { Q ) < { i
Then, ICj) holds with a strict inequality.
Then, T — ftC{Q) < 0 because we have T_ — ftC{Q) = 0 from Pp. On the 
other hand, since is satisfied with an equality, T_ — ftC{Q) — 0 must hold.
But since ft > ft, T — ftC(Q) > 0
Using this inequality in ICf), we get T — ftC(Q) > 0. So, Pf) holds with a 
strict inequality.
Therefore, A’s problem is simplified to :




P0 : T - f l C ( Q )  = 0
ICa : f - 0 C i Q )  = T - $ C i Q ) .
The constraints can be eliminated through substitution. From 
(iC{Q). Substituting this in /C^,
f  =  2 C 7 ( g ) - / 3 ( C ( Q -(.■ ((})).
Substituting r  and T  in the ol^jective function, we have:
m axf(t;Q  -  (iC{Q) +  B{C{Q) -  C{Q)) +  (1 -  tt){vQ -  ()C{Q))
Q,Q _  _  _  _  _  _
By Assumption 1, the second order conditions liold, so the solution is unique. 
The first order conditions are respectively
Q : f  (t- -  = 0 and
Q : wi-jlC'iQ) + ik''{Q)) +  (1 -  w)(v -  =  0.
Solving for Q and yields
Q =
which substituted in the expressions above yield T and T as
- « " - ' ( J ) )  ■ '
and
T = fKЦC'-ЦİL·:İl))
Note that, 1 — < 1 — t liecause 0 > 0. Therefore, Q and T_
are smaller, Q is the same and T is higher than their values in the case 
of symmetric information. A further ol.)servation is that T -  0C{Q) and 
T  > 0C(Q). From these oliservations, we reach the following conclusions:
25
1) Although the ji type produces the efficient quantity, he obtains a tranfer 
greater than his total cost of effort. But this does not cause a loss of efficiency, 
it is just a transfer. Whatever the tranfer from A to B, the important question 
is whether or not the production quantity is efficient.
2) The quantity produced by the ft type agent is less than the efficient 
quantity. Although his cost of effort is covered l>y tlie tranfer, he does not 
produce the efficient quantity. Therefore with probability tt, there will an 
inefficiency in the case of asymmetric information.
4.2.2 Contract is Offered by B
(Jonsider now the case where B offers the contract, (dearly, both types of 
B will offer their symmetric information contract since there is no change 
in the position of B: they still have the information about their own types. 
Then, maximum total surplus can be ol)tained and the resulting outcome is 
efficient.
4.3 Conclusion
From this example, 1 conclude that efficiency requires the individual who has 
the relation-specffic asset (information) to have the right to offer the take- 
it-or-leave-it contract. In the absence of information ])roblems, it does not 
matter who offers the contract as far as efficiency is concerned, the maximum 
total surplus can be obtained whoever offers the contract. In the case of 
asymmetric information, efficiency can l>e reached if B offers the contract, 
but not A. Therefore, the symmetric information case is more efficient than 
the asynmietric information case if B is a ft type and the contract is offered 
by A.
As an example, the right to offer the contract may lie determined by the 
ownership of another asset, a machine, that is used in the production. Then, 
according to my conclusion, B should own the machine if he possesses output-
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relevant private information This is to provide high powered incentives to 
B to produce the efficient quantity.
Another possible interpretation is that the information and the machine 
can be considered as complementary assets in the sense that they are more 
efficient if owned together. We conclude that such complementary assets 
should be owned together,which is parallel to Hart and Moore (1990) theory 
of ownership.
I^t may be the Cctse that the product i.s no value to liini. For example, the value v may 
come from the marketing of the product and B may not have the ability to market the 
product. So, production is no value to him without another person who can market it.
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5 T hird  E xam ple: In tegra tion  or N o n in te ­
gration
5 .1  T h e  M o d e l
In this section we present an example based on the model of Hart and Moore 
(1990). Let S  denote the set of agents and A the set of assets. There are two 
time periods in our model, time 0 and time 1. At time 0, the agents make 
some investments which are unobservable liy the other agents. For simplic­
ity, we will assume that the agents make investment only on human capital 
which will be denoted by ;c¡, i G S. Therefore, the investment increases the 
productivity of the individuals; Init not the asset's. Let x denote the invest­
ment vector of the individuals in a coalition. We will also assume that .r¿’s 
are so complex to specify and so it is very costly to write a complete contract 
at time 0. At time 1, all of the investments are ol)servable to everyone and 
some value is generated whose value dej^ends on the investments of time 0. 
Thus, the contract is negotiated under symmetric information at time 1.
We will denote the value generated b\^  a coalition S' C S  having the 
control of the assets A' C A and making the investments a;,·, where i G 
A, by v{S',A', x). The derivative of this function with respect to Xk·, i.e. 
the marginal ¡product of investment of k, where k G .S', will be denoted by 
n*^ (.S'', A', ;c). We will denote the investment cost of ;i'¿ by Ci{xi). We make 
the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: u(.S', A| •r) > 0 and t»(0, A|.r) = 0, where 0 is the empty 
set. u(.S', Al.r) is twice differentiable and concave in x.
Assumption 2: í;‘(.S', A|.r) = 0 if ¿ 0 S .
Assumption 3: ( d / d x j ) v ' ( S ,  A|;r) > 0 for all j  ^ i .
Assumption 4: For all subset S'  C .S'. A' C A, r(.S', A|a:) > u(.S'\ A’|:c)-|- 
u(.S’\,S'', A\A'|x).
Assumption 5: For all subset S'  C S. A' C A, t’'(,S', A|;r) > u*(,S'\ A’|.c).
Assumption 6: C.(.r¡) > 0 and = 0· '^1 •i’ twice differentiable
where C'(xi) > 0 and Ci'(xi) > 0.
Now, sup])ose for simplicity that there are two assets and each asset «j.
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г = 1,2 has one main worker. Besides these, there are many ’’small” workers, 
ivi, i = 1, 2, in the sense that they are dispensible.
As stated before. Hart and Moore (1990) vised a cooperative approach 
where the grand coalition forms and distributes the total according to the 
Shapley value which will not be discussed here. We will rather use a non- 
cooperative approach. We will assume that coalition are partnerships that 
they distribute the total value equally among the members.
5.2 D efinition o f Som e Concepts
Definition: An agent к is dispensable if tlie other agents’ marginal product 
of investment is unaffected by whether or not he is a member of their coali- 
tion(assuming the coalition controls a given set of assets). That is, for all 
coalitions S' containing agent к and for all sets A of assets,
vHS,A) = v H S \ { k } , A ) ' d j e S J ^ k .
The opposite of dispensability is indispensalnlity.
Definition: An agent i is indispensable to an asset if, without agent 
i in a coalition, asset has no affect on the marginal product of investment 
for the members of that coalition. That is, for all agents j in any coalition S 
and for all sets A of assets containing n,,.
■e'(,9, Л) = e-?(,S', .4\{a„)) if / ^ S.
Hart and Moore present the following ])ro])osition emphasizing the im­
portance of indispensibility.
Proposition: If an agent is indispensable to an asset, then he should 
own it.
It’s obvious that giving the ownershi]) of any asset to a person who is 
dispensable can not be ojvtimal. Hence, neither wl nor w2 should own any 
asset.
We will su])pose further that is essential to 1 and wl and «2 is essential 
to 2 and w2.
Definition: An asset is essen tial to an agent i if the marginal product 
of investment for the agents in a coalition will not Ive enhanced by agent i 
unless the coalition controls a,;. That is, for all agents j in any coaltion S 
and for all sets A of assets.
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There are four ownership alternatives: (i) 1 owns «] and 2 owns 02 (which 
can be interpreted as nonintegration), (ii) 1 owns both of the zissets (integra­
tion with 1 as the boss of the integrated firm), (iii) 2 owns both of the assets 
(integration with 2 as the boss of the integrated firm), (iv) 1 owns 02 and 2 
owns Oi·
Actually, the last alternative can be eliminated since it is dominated by 
both the second and the third alternatives. Consider giving the ownership 
of both assets to 1. Incentives of 1 and wl will increase; but incentives of 2 
and w2 will not change since they have to reac'h an agreement with 1 again 
because a-2 is essential to 2 and w2.
Now, we will consider the first and the second alternatives in detail. We 
will omit tnl and to2 in the v function since they are dispensable. Note also 
that small workers can obtain no surplus by themselves. They have to be in 
a coalition which has the control of the asset that is essential to them.
v^{S,A) =  i;^(,S'\{i},v4) rt„ ^ A.
5.3 Investm ent Incentives in N onintegration  and In­
tegration
5.3.1 Nonintegration
In this case 1 owns a\ and 2 owns «2. We will consiiler two alternatives: 1 
and 2 may work seperately or they may form a partnership and share the 
surplus equally. Let’s first state the first order conditions for investments if 
they act seperately:
1 : = id (l,a i)
2 :C ' = c2(2,a2)
wl : a i)/2 (wl has to reach an agreement with 1)
w2 : C',2 = «2)72 (w2 has to reach an agreement with 2).
If A and B form a partnersin]), their investments can be found from:
1 : C[ = td( 12, ai 02)72
2 : C-2 = ))^ (12, rt 102)72
;io
wl : (7'„j — t’’'’’(r2, aifl2)/3 (wl has to be in agreement with 1 and 2) 
w2: = r"’^ (12,flia2)/3.(wl ” )
5.3.2 Integration
Without loss of generality, we will only consider the case where 1 owns both 
of the assets. The c ase where 2 owns both of the assets is similiar. We will 
consider two alternatives: 1 and 2 may work seperately or they may form a 
hierarchy, i.e. 2 may work for 1 who owns lioth of the assets. Then, 1 will 
take all of the surjjlus and just gives a wage to 2. Let’s first state the first 
order conditions for the investments if they act seperately:
1 :
2 : No investment since (I2 is essential to him.
wl : =  u’"’’( l ,a i02)/2
w2 : No investment since (¿-¿is essential to him.
Since there are just two periods in our exam])le, 2 and w2 will make no 
investments. Although the investments are on human capital, they will not 
be able to use it in somewhere else later since there are just two periods in 
our example.
If they form a. hierarchy, their investments can lie found from;
1 : Ci =  td( 12, 010-2)
2 : No investment since he is just obtaining wage. .All the surplus which
will come from his investment will go to 1.
wl : c;,! =t-«’i ( 12,o ,02)/2
w2 : No investment by the same reasoning for 2.
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5.4 Com parison of Integration and N onintegration
Comparison of two structures in terms of efficiency depends on whether 1 
and 2 are dispensable or indispensable to any one or both assets. If 1 is 
indispensable only to aj and 2 is indispensable only to 02, 1 must own a\ 
and 2 must own a-i- If either 1 or 2 is indispensable to both assets, the 
indispensable one must be the owner of both assets. If both 1 and 2 are 
indispensable to both a\ and a-2, they must form a partnership or a hierarchy.
If no agent is indispensable to any asset, the most efficient structure be­
comes a function of the form of v. In general, if the incentives of 1 and wl 
increase more than the decrease in the incentives of 2 and w2 by transfering 
02 from 2 to 1, integration will dominate; otherwise nonintegration will dom­
inate. We will now give some general exam])les to possible funtional forms 
of V and compare integration with nonintegration.
If we suppose that n(l,airt2) depends primarily on U], in the sense that 
u ( l ,a i02) = fvi(l, ) -h ei/:Ii(l, a2) and ■c(2,a i02) depends primarily on 02, in 
the sense that v(2 ,(ija-2 ) = a-2{2 ,a 2 ) + t2/^ 2(2i«t) where ti, t2 > 0 are small, 
nonintegration dominates integration. Both 1 and 2 own the assets which 
are essential to them and neither 1 nor 2 will not make a contribution to the 
total value as much as the other does by also having the ownership of the 
other asset.
Now, suppose that u(l,oirt2) hardly depends on «i and 02, in the sense 
that u (l,o ia2) = k\ -f ■, where 63 > 0 is very small and ki G 7?.+ .
Then, 2 should own both of the assets. 1 will not make a contribution to the 
total value as much as 2 by owning any one of the assets.
Similarily, if we suppo.se that v{2 ,a-i(i2 ) hardly depends on Oi and 02, 
in the sense that u(2,a in2) = kz + where 4^ > 0 is very small
and kz € . Then, 1 shoidd own both of the assets. 2 will not make a
contribution to the total value as much as 1 by owning any one of the assets.
Many other comparisons are possil)le depending on the function v and 
the type of the integration (se])erate or jiartnership) and the nonintegration 
(seperate or hierarchy).
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6 C on clu sion
The literature suggests a number of reasons for why transaction costs in a 
firm may be lower than in a decentralized market. If transaction costs are 
always lower in the firm. They could be reduced without limit by merging 
firms to remove any market transactions. But this is not the case. In our 
first example we present one disadvantage of firms, i.e. unified structures, 
and that is monitoring. Monitoring is an additional cost which does not 
exist when the units are operating seperately. In that example we interpret 
the hierarchy as a more unified structure than the partnership in the sense 
that ownership of assets are more concentrated in the hierarchy. From that 
example, we have the following conclusions: if the cost of working is small 
relative to the benefit of working, the partnership structure is more efficient 
than the hierarchy structure, imposing a limit on the size of an organization, 
if the cost of working is high relative to the lienefit of working, two structures 
are equivalently efficient since noone will jirefer to work. For some interval of 
cost of working within these two extremes, the hierarchy may be more efficient 
than the partnership depending on the cost and effectiveness of monitoring.
In our second example, we introduce the possibility of private information 
by one party. The most important conclusion from that example in terms 
of ownership is that two cospecialized assets-that is assets that are most 
productive when used together- should be owned together. In that example, 
one of the assets was a ’’machine” and the other was ’’information”.
In the third example, we see that the integration of the production units 
is associated with a shift in decision making authority and a change in the 
relative bargaining ])ower of the individual ])roduction units. Assuming that 
the contracts are incomplete and the investments are relation-specific, inte­
gration yields a more efficient outcome than nonintegration if the investment 
decisions of one production unit has a significantly greater impact on the 
joint surplus from investment than the other unit’s investment decision.
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8 A p p en d ix
Here, we complete the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2. We shall examine the 
corresponding strategy space to show that no other Nash equilibrium exists 
besides those listed in the Propositions.
The remaining proof of Proposition 1
Claim 1 : — 0) (-'‘b — 0,r/ig = 0) } or =
0,m^ = 0) and {x*ß = l,m ^  > 0) } can not be Nash equilibria.
P ro o f : Without loss of generality, we provide a proof of the first strategy 
configuration. Given B does not work and so will not, monitor, A prefers to 
work if
(,S'(1)/2)(1 +p(m ^)) -  d{m*^) -  c>  0.
Given A works and monitors, B prefers to work if
(5 (2 ) /2 ) -c < ( l- , ,(m -J ) (Ä '( l ) /2 ) .
From the first condition, we get
c < (,S'(1)/2)(1 +p(m;^)) -
Combining the last inequality with the second condition, we have: 
5‘(2)/2 -  (1 -p(m*A)) < (5'(1)/2)(1 + p{rn*^)) -  d{m*^).
Arranging the terms gives us 
^  -  ,S'(1) < -d{m*^).
From Assumption 1, the left hand side is positive. From Assuption 3, the 
right hand side is negative. Therefore, the required two conditions can never 
be satisfied for any values of the parameters, hence the strategies in claim 1 
do not form a Nash equilibria.
Claim 2 : {{xa = ^  0) (-Pb ^ [0,1],«ig = 0) } or {(a:^ 6
[0,1], = 0) and {x*ß — l ,mß  > 0) } can not be Nash equilibria.
P ro o f : We consider the first case. Given B is indifferent between working 
and not working and that he does not monitor, A prefers to work and monitor 
B if
+ (1 -  -rB)(l + -  d(m*^) -  c >
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Given A works and monitors B, B does not monitor A since he is sure 
that A works. He is indifferent between working and not working if
Solving for from the second condition and substituting into the
first condition gives the following inequality:
+ 5’(1) -  ^  + c -  -  x*Bp{rn:^)^ -  d{rn\) -  c > x y ^ ^ .
By arranging this last inequality, we have
< 0.
But it is impossible for the above inequality to hold since ^
0, d(m^) > 0 and from Assumption 1, —(1 — a:2))(,S'(l) — > 0. So, the
specified strategies can not be a Nash equilibrium.
The remaining proof of Proposition 2
First note that there can not be any Nash equilibria in the hierarchy 
where B works, i.e. xb = 1· This is .so because if B works, A does not 
monitor him; but if B is not monitored, he does not work. Hence, Xß = 1 
can not be a Nash equilibrium strategy. We are left just one strategy for A 
and B which is not included in Proposition 1. This strategy configuration is: 
G [0, l],m^ > 0) and x*^  G [0,1]}.
Let us show that this is not a Nash equilibrium. Given that B is indifferent 
between working and not working, A is also indifferent between working and 
not working if
x^(.S’(2)-u;*)+(l-x^)(.S '(l)-u;*+p(m ^)ii;*)-d(iii^)-c = x|,(5'(l)-w *).
On the other hand, from B’s point of view, we must have:
w* — c = x^(l —
After simplyfing the first condition above. Assumption 1, Assumption 2 
and the fact that Xß < 1 imply
5(2) — 5(1) < c — w.
Since 5 (2 )-.S '(l) > 0 from Assumption 1, c must be strictly greater than 
w. But it is straightforward to see from the second condition that u; > 0, 
contradicting the implication from the other condition. Therefore, there can 
not be a Nash outcome where both A and B are indifferent between working 
and not working.
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